The Means Of Defense Against Foreign Danger

There Ought Always To Be A Constitutional Method Of Giving Efficacy To Constitutional Provisions. What For Instance Would Avail Restrictions On The Authority Of The State Legislatures, Without Some Constitutional Mode Of Enforcing The Observance Of Them? . . . This Power Must Either Be A Direct Negative On The State Laws, Or An Authority In The Federal Courts, To Over-rule Such As Might Be In Manifest Contravention Of The Articles Of Union.

I Think It Absolutely Necessary That The President Should Have The Power Of Removing His Subordinates From Office; It Will Make Him, In A Peculiar Manner, Responsible For Their Conduct, And Subject Him To Impeachment Himself, If He Suffers Them To Perpetrate With Impunity High Crimes Or Misdemeanors Against The United States, Or Neglects To Superintend Their Conduct, So As To Check Their Excesses.

Temporary Deviations From Fundamental Principles Are Always More Or Less Dangerous. When The First Pretext Fails, Those Who Become Interested In Prolonging The Evil Will Rarely Be At A Loss For Other Pretexts.

Having Outlived So Many Of My Contemporaries, I Ought Not To Forget That I May Be Thought To Have Outlived Myself.

Hence It Is That Such Democracies Have Ever Been Spectacles Of Turbulence And Contention; Have Ever Been Found Incompatible With Personal Security Or The Rights Of Property; And Have In General Been As Short In Their Lives As They Have Been Violent In Their Deaths. Theoretic Politicians, Who Have Patronized This Species Of Government, Have Erroneously Supposed That By Reducing Mankind To A Perfect Equality In Their Political Rights, They Would, At The Same Time, Be Perfectly Equalized And Assimilated In Their Possessions, Their Opinions, And Their Passions.