You Can't *discover* That The Brain Is

It Seems To Me Obvious That Infants And Many Animals That Do Not In Any Ordinary Sense Have A Language Or Perform Speech Acts Nonetheless Have Intentional States. Only Someone In The Grip Of A Philosophical Theory Would Deny That Small Babies Can Literally Be Said To Want Milk And That Dogs Want To Be Let Out Or Believe That Their Master Is At The Door.

The Problem Posed By Indirect Speech Acts Is The Problem Of How It Is Possible For The Speaker To Say One Thing And Mean That But Also To Mean Something Else.

In The Performance Of An Illocutionary Act In The Literal Utterance Of A Sentence, The Speaker Intends To Produce A Certain Effect By Means Of Getting The Hearer To Recognize His Intention To Produce That Effect; And Furthermore, If He Is Using The Words Literally, He Intends This Recognition To Be Achieved In Virtue Of The Fact That The Rules For Using The Expressions He Utters Associate The Expression With The Production Of That Effect.

Our Tools Are Extensions Of Our Purposes, And So We Find It Natural To Make Metaphorical Attributions Of Intentionality To Them; But I Take It No Philosophical Ice Is Cut By Such Examples.

Berkeley Had A Liberal Element In The Student Body Who Tended To Be Quite Active. I Think That's In General A Feature Of Intellectually Active Places.